Jerusalem Talmud Horayot 1:1

משנה: הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין לַעֲבוֹר עַל אַחַת מִכָּל־מִצְוֹת הָאֲמוּרוֹת בַּתּוֹרָה וְהָלַךְ הַיָּחִיד וְעָשָׂה שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶם בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהֶן בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה אַחֲרֵיהֶן בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא עָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה פָּטוּר מִפְּנֵי שֶׁתָּלָה בְבֵית דִּין. הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין וְיָדַע אֶחָד מֵהֶן שֶׁטָּעוּ אוֹ תַלְמִיד שֶׁהוּא רָאוּי לְהוֹרָייָה וְהָלַךְ וְעָשָׂה עַל פִּיהֶם בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה עִמָּהֶם בֵּין שֶׁעָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה אַחֲרֵיהֶם בֵּין שֶׁלֹּא עָשׂוּ וְעָשָׂה הֲרֵי זֶה חַייָב מִפְּנֵי שֶׁלֹּא תָלָה בְבֵית דִּין. זֶה הַכְּלָל הַתּוֹלֶה בְעַצְמוֹ חַייָב וְהַתּוֹלֶה בְבֵית דִּין פָּטוּר׃ MISHNAH: If the Court¹The High Court. ruled to violate one of the commandments spelled out in the Torah²A commandment clearly spelled out, like the prohibition of eating blood, where the biblical text does not imply an authorization of the rabbinical authorities to define the parameters of the obligation. and a single person went and acted inadvertently³When the Court realized its error and changed its ruling, the person acting in good faith on their prior ruling is now faced with the fact that his act violated a biblical commandment, against his intention. following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is not liable⁴For a purification sacrifice (Leviticus.4.27-35">Lev. 4:27–35) or, in the absence of a Temple, repentance and an expiatory action. since he depended on the Court. If the Court ruled but one of them knew that they erred, or a student worthy of ordination⁵He knows how to answer when asked any question of religious law. went and acted following their pronouncement, whether they acted and he acted simultaneously with them, or they acted and he followed their example, or they did not act but he did, he is liable⁴For a purification sacrifice (Leviticus.4.27-35">Lev. 4:27–35) or, in the absence of a Temple, repentance and an expiatory action. since he did not depend on the Court. This is the principle: The person depending on himself is liable⁶This rule, which declares that no instruction of the High Court supersedes one’s own certain knowledge, does not contradict the law of the rebellious Elder (Sanhedrin Chapter 8) since by definition the rebellious Elder came to ask the High Court; in the matter he came to ask, his knowledge is not independent of the Court., but one depending on the Court is not liable.

הלכה: הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין כול׳. נֶ֗פֶשׁ כִּי־תֶֽחֱטָ֤א. אַחַ֛ת תֶּֽחֱטָ֥א. בַּעֲשׂוֹתָהּ תֶּֽחֱטָ֥א. הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ מִיעוּטִין. הַתּוֹלֶה בְעַצְמוֹ חַייָב וְהַתּוֹלֶה בְבֵית דִּין פָּטוּר׃ בְּכָל־אַתָר אַתָּ מַר. מִיעוּט אַחַר מִיעוּט לְרַבּוֹת. וָכָא אַתָּ מַר. מִיעוּט אַחַר מִיעוּט לְמָעֵט. אָמַר רִבִּי מַתַּנְיָה. שַׁנְייָא הִיא. דִּכְתִיב מִיעוּט אַחַר מִיעוּט אַחַר מִיעוּט. HALAKHAH: ⁷The text is that of the Leiden ms., the readings are those of the Yerushalmi text in the Bomberg Babli of 1520.“If the Court ruled.” etc. A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions⁸The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Leviticus.4.2">Lev.4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Horayot.2b">Babli 2b, discussed in detail Šabbat93a.
Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Horayot 3:2:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Horayot.3.2.1">Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Shabbat.93a">Babli Šabbat93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable. Everywhere it is said that a restriction after a restriction is an addition, but here it is said, a restriction after a restriction is to reduce? Rebbi Mattaniah said, it is different here since there is written a restriction after a restriction after a restriction⁹It is a generally recognized principle that a double restriction is an addition and a double addition a restriction (Peah 6:7:3" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Peah.6.7.3">Peah 6:9 Note 154, Yevamot 12:1:4" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Yevamot.12.1.4">Yebamot 12:1 Note 10, Sotah 9:2:6" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Sotah.9.2.6">Sotah9:2 Note 63, Roš Haššanah 1:1 56a l.58, Megillah 4:4 75b l.14; Megillah.23b">Babli Megillah23b, Yoma.43a">Yoma 43a, Bava qamma 15b, Bava batra 15a, Sanhedrin.15a">Sanhedrin 15a,Sanhedrin.44b">44b,Sanhedrin.66a">66a, Makkot.9b">Makkot 9b, Shevuot.7b">Ševuot 7b, Menachot.9b">Menahot 9b,Menachot.67a">67a, Chullin.132a">Hulin 132a.) The principle is extended here to read that any even number of restrictions (additions) is an addition (restriction) while any odd number of restrictions (additions) is a restriction (addition); cf. Sanhedrin 15a" href="/Rashi_on_Sanhedrin.15a">Rashi in Sanhedrin 15a s. v. חמשה..

רִבִּי חַגַּיי שָׁאַל לַחֲבֵרַייָה. מְנַיִין לָאוֹכֵל בִּרְשׁוּת שֶׁהוּא פָטוּר. מַה בֵּין סָבוּר שֶׁהוּא חוּלִין וְנִמְצֵאת תְּרוּמָה שֶׁהוּא חַייָב. מַה בֵּין הַמַּחֲזִיק בְּעַצְמוֹ שֶׁהוּא כֹהֵן וְנִמְצָא יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁהוּא פָטוּר. אָֽמְרִין לֵיהּ. מִן הוֹרָיוֹת בֵּית דִּין. אָמַר לוֹן. אוֹף אֲנָא צְרִיכָא לִי. מַה בֵּין סָבוּר שֶׁהוּא חוֹל וְנִמְצֵאת שַׁבָּת שֶׁהוּא חַייָב. מַה בֵּין סָבוּר שֶׁהוּא פֶסַח וְנִמְצָא שְׁלָמִים שֶׁהוּא פָטוּר. אָֽמְרִין לֵיהּ. מִן הַשּׁוֹחֵט בִּרְשׁוּת. אָמַר לוֹן. אוֹף אֲנָא צְרִיכָה לִי. מַה בֵּין סָבוּר שֶׁהוּא מוּתָּר וְנִמְצָא אָסוּר שֶׁהוּא חַייָב. מַה בֵּין סָבוּר שֶׁהוּא חֵלֶב וְנִמְצָא שׁוּמָּן שֶׁהוּא פָטוּר. לֹא אָֽמְרוּ לֵיהּ כְּלוּם. אָמַר לוֹן. נֵימָא לְכוֹן מִינָּן. א֚וֹ הוֹדַ֣ע אֵלָ֔יו חַטָּאת֖וֹ וְהֵבִ֨יא. עָאַל רִבִּי יוֹסֵי. אָֽמְרִין לֵיהּ. קַשִׁי לַן הָדָא מִילְּתָא. אָמַר לוֹן. וְלָמָּה לָא אַגִּיבְתּוֹנֵיהּ מִן הָדָא א֚וֹ הוֹדַ֣ע אֵלָ֔יו חַטָּאת֖וֹ וְהֵבִ֨יא. אָֽמְרִין לֵיהּ. חַגַּיי קְשִׁיתָהּ חַגַּיי קִייַמְתָּהּ. ¹⁰This paragraph has a parallel in Terumot 8:1:3" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Terumot.8.1.3">Terumot 8:1, Notes 14–22. As explained there, the background of the paragraph in Terumot is different from the one presumed here; therefore at a place where the readings there and here seem to be opposite to one another, both are correct in their settings. Rebbi Ḥaggai asked the colleagues: From where that he who eats with permission be not liable¹¹Referring to Mishnah Terumot 8:1; a childless woman of non-priestly birth, married to a Cohen, was eating heave in purity, as is her right and duty, when she was informed of her husband’s death. By this death she returns to her non-priestly status and heave is forbidden to her. Nevertheless, she is not liable for a reparation sacrifice nor to pay for the heave eaten in error. This is the topic of Terumot 8:1, it is not followed up here.? What is the difference between him¹²An Israel to whom heave is forbidden, Mishnah Terumot 6:1. who thought that it was profane but it turned out to be heave, who is liable, and him who thought that he was a Cohen but it turned out that he was an Israel, who is not liable¹³He had been told from childhood that he was a Cohen; he was stripped of his priesthood by a court on the testimony of two witnesses that one of his female ancestors had been forbidden to her Cohen husband. His case is not different from that of the woman in Horayot 1:1:3" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Horayot.1.1.3">Note 12.? They said to him, by the instruction of the court. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was weekday but it turned out that it was Sabbath¹⁴This is a paradigm of an inadvertent sin as mentioned in Leviticus.4.27">Lev. 4:27., who is liable, and him who thought that it was a Passover sacrifice but it turned out to be a well-being offering, who is not liable¹⁵Cf. Terumot 8:1:3" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Terumot.8.1.3">Terumot 8:1, Note 18. The Passover sacrifice must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the 14^th of Nisan, whether Sabbath or weekday. A festival wellbeing offering may not be slaughtered on the Sabbath. If the 14^th was a Sabbath and somebody slaughtered a sheep in the Temple courtyard thinking that it was a designated Passover sacrifice when in fact it had been designated as a well-being offering, R. Joshua, an overriding authority, declares him not liable (Pesachim 6:3:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Pesachim.6.3.1">Mishnah Pesahim 6:4).. They said to him, because he slaughtered with permission. He said to them, still I am having a problem. What is the difference between him who thought that it was permitted but it turned out to be forbidden¹⁵Cf. Terumot 8:1:3" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Terumot.8.1.3">Terumot 8:1, Note 18. The Passover sacrifice must be slaughtered in the afternoon of the 14^th of Nisan, whether Sabbath or weekday. A festival wellbeing offering may not be slaughtered on the Sabbath. If the 14^th was a Sabbath and somebody slaughtered a sheep in the Temple courtyard thinking that it was a designated Passover sacrifice when in fact it had been designated as a well-being offering, R. Joshua, an overriding authority, declares him not liable (Pesachim 6:3:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Pesachim.6.3.1">Mishnah Pesahim 6:4)., who is liable, and him who thought that it was forbidden fat¹⁶Fat of animals which would be burned on the altar if these animals were sacrifices, and the fat into which ischiatic tendons are embedded, is forbidden for human consumption. All other fat is permitted. If a person intended to commit a sin but, unknown to him at the time, failed to commit the sin, he is not liable for a purification sacrifice. and it turned out to be permitted fat, who is not liable. They did not answer at all. He told them, let me tell you from myself¹⁷Translated using the Bomberg Babli text.: Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring¹⁸Leviticus.4.28">Lev. 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God.. Rebbi Yossi came to visit them; they told him, that problem is hard for us. He asked them, why did you not answer him, or his transgression in which hesinned was made known to him; he has to bring? They told him, Ḥaggai asked the question, Ḥaggai gave the answer.

עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל דְּלָא מַפְנֶה אָהֵן קִרְייָה בִּמְחוּייָבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת ווַדָּאִין שֶׁעָבַר עֲלֵיהֶן יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים נִיחָא. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה דְּמַפְנֶה אָהֵן קִרְייָה בִּמְחוּייָבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת ווַדָּאִין שֶׁעָבַר עֲלֵיהֶן יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים. דְּתַנֵּי. מְנַיִין לִמְחוּייָבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת ווַדָּאִין שֶׁעָבַר עֲלֵיהֶן יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים שֶׁהֵן חַייָבִין לְהָבִיא לְאַחַר יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים וְחַייְבֵי אֲשָׁמוֹת תְּלוּיִין פְּטוּרִין. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר א֚וֹ הוֹדַ֣ע אֵלָ֔יו חַטָּאת֖וֹ וְהֵבִ֨יא. אַף לְאַחַר יוֹם הַכִּיפּוּרִים. מִן הָדָא. נֶ֗פֶשׁ כִּי־תֶֽחֱטָ֤א. אַחַ֛ת תֶּֽחֱטָ֥א. בַּעֲשׂוֹתָהּ. הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ מִיעוּטִין. הַתּוֹלֶה בְעַצְמוֹ חַייָב. הַתּוֹלֶה בְבֵית דִּין פָּטוּר׃ In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael, who does not refer this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, it is understandable¹⁹This paragraph has no direct connection with the theme of the Mishnah, but is added here to elucidate Leviticus.4.27">Lev. 4:27. Since our halakhic Midrashim are all from the school of R. Aqiba, we have to accept the occasional indications of the Yerushalmi on the interpretations of the school of R. Ismael. For him, the verses 4:27–28 detail the conditions on which a private person is permitted and obligated to bring a purification offering.. But what is the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba, who refers this verse to those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, as we have stated²⁰Keritot 6:4" href="/Mishnah_Keritot.6.4">Mishnah Keritut 6:4; Sifra Wayyiqra 2 Paršetah 3(1), 6(1), Leviticus.16.1-18.30">Ahare Mot Parašah4(8).
Reparation sacrifices are required (1) for sins against a fellow man after restitution (Leviticus.5.20-26">Lev. 5:20–26; Numbers.5.5-10">Num. 5:5–10), (2) misappropriation of sancta(Leviticus.5.14-16">Lev.5:14–16), (3) to regain sanctified status after skin disease (Leviticus.14">Lev. 14). A suspended reparation sacrifice is due if a person suspects that he may have committed an inadvertent sin, without having proof either way. Since the sin is forgiven on the Day of Atonement (with due repentance), such a sacrifice cannot be offered after that day since the scapegoat carries away all iniquities (Leviticus.16.21">Lev. 16:21).: From where that those obligated for purification sacrifices and certain reparation sacrifices for whom the Day of Atonement had passed, are obligated to bring them after the Day of Atonement, but those obligated for suspended reparation offerings are no longer liable? The verse says¹⁸Leviticus.4.28">Lev. 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God., or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him; he has to bring, even after the Day of Atonement. ²¹This copy from the first paragraph has no discernible meaning here. From the following: A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions⁸The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Leviticus.4.2">Lev.4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Horayot.2b">Babli 2b, discussed in detail Šabbat93a.
Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Horayot 3:2:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Horayot.3.2.1">Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Shabbat.93a">Babli Šabbat93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, {but one dependent}⁹It is a generally recognized principle that a double restriction is an addition and a double addition a restriction (Peah 6:7:3" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Peah.6.7.3">Peah 6:9 Note 154, Yevamot 12:1:4" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Yevamot.12.1.4">Yebamot 12:1 Note 10, Sotah 9:2:6" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Sotah.9.2.6">Sotah9:2 Note 63, Roš Haššanah 1:1 56a l.58, Megillah 4:4 75b l.14; Megillah.23b">Babli Megillah23b, Yoma.43a">Yoma 43a, Bava qamma 15b, Bava batra 15a, Sanhedrin.15a">Sanhedrin 15a,Sanhedrin.44b">44b,Sanhedrin.66a">66a, Makkot.9b">Makkot 9b, Shevuot.7b">Ševuot 7b, Menachot.9b">Menahot 9b,Menachot.67a">67a, Chullin.132a">Hulin 132a.) The principle is extended here to read that any even number of restrictions (additions) is an addition (restriction) while any odd number of restrictions (additions) is a restriction (addition); cf. Sanhedrin 15a" href="/Rashi_on_Sanhedrin.15a">Rashi in Sanhedrin 15a s. v. חמשה. on the Court is not liable.

אֵין חַייָבִין אֶלָּא עַל דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה גָלוּי לָהֶן וְנִכְסֶה מֵהֶן. וּמַה טַעַם. וְנֶעְלַ֣ם דָּבָ֔ר. דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה גָלוּי לָהֶן וְנִכְסֶה מֵהֶן. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל דּוּ אָמַר. וְנֶעְלַ֣ם מִמֶּ֔נּוּ. מִכְּלָל שֶׁהָיָה יוֹדֵעַ. וְה֥וּא יָדַ֖ע. הֲרֵי שְׁתֵּי יָדִיעוֹת. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי עֲקִיבָה דּוּ אָמַר. וְנֶעְלַ֣ם מִמֶּ֔נּוּ וְנֶעְלַ֣ם מִמֶּ֑נּוּ שְׁנֵי פְעָמִים. מִכְּלָל שֶׁבָּאת לוֹ יְדִיעָה בַּתְּחִילָּה וִידִיעָה בְסּוֹף וְהֶעֱלֵם בֵּינְתַיִים. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר וְנֶעְלַ֣ם דָּבָר. דָּבָר שֶׁהָיָה גָלוּי לָהֶם וְנִכְסֶה מֵהֶן. ²²Here one returns to a discussion of the theme of the Tractate, viz., the obligation of the High Court, as representatives of the people, to offer a purification sacrifice for a wrong ruling as described in Leviticus.4.13-21">Lev. 4:13–21.
It is sinful to bring an animal into the Temple precinct which is not dedicated as a sacrifice. For voluntary offerings this presents no problem; one simply has to dedicate them when bringing. But for obligatory offerings it implies that a sacrifice may be presented only if all conditions which make it obligatory are actually fulfilled. They only are liable²³To bring the sacrifice. for something²⁴An official ruling by the Court. that was clear to them and then covered from them²⁵They forgot either a precedent or their own ruling.. What is the reason? something was hidden²⁶Leviticus.4.13">Lev. 4:13. An erring High Priest (Leviticus.4.1-12">Lev. 4:1–12) or ruler (22–26) have to offer a sacrifice if they err inadvertently; the condition that a ruling must have been forgotten is introduced only for the Court., something that was clear to them and then hidden from them. ²⁷There is no problem with the explanation just given. One tries to connect the statement with a discussion about similar rules regarding sacrifices due for violations of either Temple purity or oaths (Leviticus.5.1-13">Lev. 5:1–13), where the same condition in mentioned in Leviticus.5.2">Lev. 5:2,Leviticus.5.3">3,Leviticus.5.4">4. R. Ismael and R. Aqiba differ in Ševuot 1:2 about the interpretation of the verses, but not about the actual rules. In the opinion of Rebbi Ismael who said, it became hidden from him, therefore he had known, and he knew²⁸Leviticus.5.4">Lev. 5:4: …an oath which a man would utter without thinking, it became hidden from him, and he knew and realized his guilt …, these are two knowledges²⁹One when he uttered the oath and one when he remembered it, separated by a period of oblivion.. In the opinion of Rebbi Aqiba who said, it became hidden, it became hidden, two times³⁰R. Aqiba and R. Ismael actually are not differing in their interpretations; only R. Aqiba argues about violations of Temple purity (Leviticus.5.2-3">Lev. 5:2–3) where in both verses oblivion is mentioned but not remembering. However, in Babylonian sources [Shevuot.14b">Ševuot 14b, Keritot.19a">Keritut 19a, Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Pereq 12(7)], R. Ismael is reported to read one about oblivion the impurity and the second oblivion about being in the Temple., therefore he had knowledge at the beginning and knowledge at the end and oblivion in between, ³¹Returning to our topic, Horayot 1:1:5" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Horayot.1.1.5">Note 22. something that was clear to them and then hidden from them.

אֵין חַייָבִין עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַייֵם מִקְצָת. שְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר. וְהֵן שֶׁהוֹרוּ מוּתָּר. אֲבָל אִם הוֹרוּ פָטוּר לֹא בְדָא. אֵין חַייָבִין עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא הוֹרָייָה מִלִּישְׁכַּת הָגָּזִית. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן. טַעֲמֵיהּ דְהַךְ תַנָּייָא מִן־הַמָּק֣וֹם הַה֔וּא אֲשֶׁר֭ יִבְחַ֣ר יְי. אָמַר רִבִּי מָנָא בַּר תַּנְחוּם. נִכְנְסוּ מֵאָה. עַד שֶׁיּוֹרוּ כוּלָּן. תַּמָּן אָמַר רִבִּי זְעִירָא. וְהוּא שְׁיְּהוּ כוּלָּן מוֹרִין מִצַּד אֶחָד. וָכָא מַה. They are not liable unless they void part and confirm part³²If they declared a biblical prohibition as void, nobody would follow them since even schoolchildren would know that this is wrong. But if they were to abolish traditional restrictions, they would be followed. This is explicit in Horayot 1:3:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Horayot.1.3.1">Mishnah 3; cf. Horayot.4a">Babli 4a, Horayot 1:5" href="/Tosefta_Horayot.1.5">Tosephta 1:7, Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah 4(7).. Samuel said, only if they ruled that it was permitted; but not if they ruled that it was not prosecutable³³This is a commentary on the preceding sentence. Abolishing a biblical commandment entirely means declaring the prohibition as void; declaring it valid but unenforceable means partly confirming it.. They are not liable unless instruction was given from the ashlar hall³⁴The seat of the High Court; Sanhedrin 1:4:3" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Sanhedrin.1.4.3">Sanhedrin Chapter 1, Note 345.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, the reason of this Tanna: From that place which the Eternal will choose³⁵Deuteronomy.17.10">Deut. 17:10.. Rebbi Mana bar Tanḥum said, if a hundred came together, only if they ruled unanimously³⁶The ruling triggers the obligation of a purification sacrifice only if it was unanimous, including the opinions of the law students sitting before the 72 members of the Court. Mishnah 4 requires in addition that the president of the court be present and voting [Horayot.4b">Babli 4b, Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah 4(4).]. There³⁷Sanhedrin 1:2:13" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Sanhedrin.1.2.13">Sanhedrin 1:2, Note 166. He holds that a ruling of the High Court to intercalate a month based on the testimony of laymen is valid only if it not only is unanimous in fact but also in reason. Concurrent opinions, reaching the same conclusion for different reasons, invalidate the judgment. Why is this not mentioned here? The text confirms the reading of the ms. in Roš Haššanah(2:6 58b l.25) against the one in Sanhedrin., Rebbi Zeˋira said, only if they all rule for the same reason. And here, what³⁸B has the usual formula, “and here he says so?”?

הָלַךְ הַיָּחִיד וְעָשָׂה שׁוֹגֵג עַל פִּיהֶן. וְכִי יֵשׁ זְדוֹן שְׁגָגָה לְיָחִיד אֶצֶל הוֹרָייַת בֵּית דִּין. רִבִּי אִימִּי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן לָקִישׁ. מַתְנִיתָא כְּגוֹן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי יוֹשֵׁב לִפְנֵיהֶן. מָה אֲנָן קַייָמִין. אִם בְּיוֹדֵעַ כָּל־הַתּוֹרָה וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ אוֹתוֹ דָּבָר אֵין זֶה שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי. וְאִם בְּיוֹדֵעַ אוֹתוֹ הַדָּבָר וְאֵינוֹ יוֹדֵעַ כָּל־הַתּוֹרָה שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי הוּא אֶצֶל אוֹתוֹ הַדָּבָר. אֶלָּא כִּי נָן קַייָמִין בְּיוֹדֵעַ כָּל־הַתּוֹרָה וּבְיוֹדֵעַ אוֹתוֹ הַדָּבָר. אֶלָּא שֶׁהוּא כְטוֹעֶה לוֹמַר. תּוֹרָה אָֽמְרָה אַחֲרֵיהֶם אַחֲרֵיהֶם. וְאִם בְּטוֹעֶה לוֹמַר הַתּוֹרָה אָֽמְרָה אַחֲרֵיהֶם אַחֲרֵיהֶם. אֵין זֶה שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן עַזַּאי. כְּהָדָא דְתַנֵּי. יָכוֹל אִם יֹאמְרוּ לָךְ עַל יְמִין שֶׁהִיא שְׂמֹאל וְעַל שְׂמֹאל שֶׁהִיא יְמִין תִּשְׁמַע לָהֶם. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר לָלֶכֶת יָמִין וּשְׂמֹאל. שֶׁיֹּאמְרוּ לָךְ עַל יָמִין שֶׁהוּא יָמִין וְעַל שְׂמֹאל שֶׁהִיא שְׂמֹאל. מַאי כְדוֹן. רִבִּי יוֹסֵי בְשֵׁם רִבִּי הִילָא. לְפִי שֶׁבְּכָל־מָקוֹם שׁוֹגֵג פָטוּר וּמֵזִיד חַייָב. וָכָא אֲפִילוּ מֵזִיד פָּטוּר. מִפְּנֵי שֶׁתָּלָה בְּבֵית דִּין. “And a single person went and acted inadvertently³When the Court realized its error and changed its ruling, the person acting in good faith on their prior ruling is now faced with the fact that his act violated a biblical commandment, against his intention. following their pronouncement.” Is there an intentional inadvertent action concerning an instruction by the Court³⁹The formulation of the Mishnah does not make any sense. The person who follows the instructions of the Court does this intentionally; how can he be inadvertent?? Rebbi Immi in the name of Rebbi Simeon ben Laqish: Our Mishnah, for example, if Simeon ben Azzai⁴⁰The paradigm of the know-all; he was ready to answer any question about religious law on the spot. The Babli knows of a number of famous rabbis who tried to imitate him but quickly were confronted with a question they could not answer. He never was ordained; therefore he could not have been part of the Court, but as an outsider he could have pointed out the Court’s error. was sitting before them. Where do we hold? If he knows the entire Torah but does not know this detail, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. If he knows this particular subject but not the entire Torah, he is Simeon ben Azzai for this particular subject. But we must hold that he knows the entire Torah and knows the particular subject, but he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them⁴¹This is the expression which R. Jehudah ben Bathyra used to convince Hanania ben Hanania, the foremost authority in Babylonia, to accept the overriding authority of the patriarch’s court in Palestine (Nazir 6:3:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Nazir.6.3.1">Nazir 6:13, Note 128; Sanhedrin 1:2, p. 36).. If he errs to believe that the Torah said, after them, after them, he is not Simeon ben Azzai. As we have stated, I could think that if they tell you about right that it is left, and about left that it is right, you should listen to them? The verse says, “to go to the right or to the left;⁴²A misquote of Deuteronomy.17.11">Deut. 17:11.” that they should tell you about the right that it is right, and about the left that it is left⁴³This is the opposite of the teachings of Sifry Deut. 154, Cant. rabba 1(18), which require one to follow the instructions of the rabbis even if they tell him to believe that left is right. Sound methodology would require one to follow the Talmud in preference to Midrashim. The Sifry text seems to be formulated as a polemic against the Yerushalmi.. What about it⁴⁴Since the first explanation of the Mishnah was found to be untenable, what would be a reasonable explanation?? Rebbi Yose in the name of Rebbi Hila: Because everywhere for an inadvertent sin one is not liable but for an intentional one is liable, and here even intentionally he is not liable⁴⁵Any action following the wrong teachings of the High Court has the status of unintended action even if it was intended. “Liable” and “not liable” here refer to criminal responsibility, not to obligations to offer sacrifices..

חֲבֵרַייָא בְשֵׁם שְׁמוּאֵל. יָחִיד מַשְׁלִים לְרוֹב הַצִּיבּוּר הִיא מַתְנִיתָא. אֲבָל כָּל־יָחִיד וְיָחִיד שֶׁעָשָׂה בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ פָּטוּר. אָמַר רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אֲפִילוּ כָּל־יָחִיד וְיָחִיד שֶׁעָשָׂה בִפְנֵי עַצְמוֹ מֵבִיא כִשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה. וְקַשְׁיָא עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל לֹא נִמְצָא כָּל־יָחִיד וְיָחִיד מִתְכַּפֵּר לוֹ בִשְׁנֵי חַטָּאוֹת. רִבִּי זְעִירָא בְשֵׁם שְׁמוּאֵל. הַיָּחִיד תָלוּי. אָֽכְלוּ רוֹב. בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין. אָֽכְלוּ מִיעוּט. הַיָּחִיד מֵבִיא. כָּל־הַהוֹרָייָה שֶׁבֵּית דִּין פָּר אֵין הַיָּחִיד מֵבִיא כִשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה. The colleagues in the name of Samuel. The Mishnah deals with an individual who complements the multitude⁴⁶As explained at the end of the paragraph (Horayot.2b">Babli 2b in the name of R. Jehudah). His problem with the prior explanation is that it does not fit the setting of the Mishnah. Since we are referring to sacrifices, the inadvertent sinner, while he is immune to prosecution, is obligated to bring a purification sacrifice; the intentional sinner, who can be punished, is barred from bringing a sacrifice. Therefore, if one compares the intentional to the unintentional sinner, the opposite of the argument of R. Hila should be formulated. (In contrast to the Babli, the Yerushalmi does not care for chronological consistency; Samuel of the first generation opposes R. Hila of the third.). But any individual who acted on his own is not liable⁴⁷Horayot 1:2" href="/Tosefta_Horayot.1.2">Tosephta 1:2. If somebody acted in parallel with the ruling of the court but following his own interpretation of the biblical law, he is not liable for a purification sacrifice since in fact he is barred from offering one, and since he happened to act in parallel with the Court’s ruling neither is he prosecutable. Both interpretations of פטור are possible here. There is no reason to change the text which is confirmed by the two Yerushalmi texts and the Tosephta.. Rebbi Joḥanan said, even any single individual who acted on his own brings a female sheep or goat⁴⁸Since acting on a faulty interpretation is qualified as acting in error, which for an individual requires the offering of a female sheep or goat (Horayot 1:1:8" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Horayot.1.1.8">Note 51).. It is difficult. In Samuel’s opinion, would any single individual be atoned by two sacrifices⁴⁹Since, as is explained next, Samuel makes the Court’s offering dependent on whether a majority of the people acted on their instructions or not, it could be that after a number of individuals brought their own sacrifices it turns out that in the end a majority forces the Court to bring its own. But there cannot be more than one sacrifice for one infraction. Since the purification offering is eaten by the priests, it cannot be retroactively nullified.? Rebbi Zeˋira in the name of Samuel: The individual is suspended⁵⁰The problem raised in the previous Note cannot occur. The individuals are prevented from bringing their own sacrifices until the situation is cleared.. If a majority ate, the court brings. If a minority ate, each individual brings. For any ruling for which the court [bring] a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep or goat⁵¹Lev. 27:35.. ⁵²Translation of the text of B, expanding the last sentence of the Leiden ms. For any ruling for which the court bring a bull, the individual does not bring a female sheep; for any ruling for which the court does not bring a bull, the individual brings a female sheep or goat. Samuel explains the Mishnah by majority and minority. If a majority ate⁵³Referring to the standard example, that the Court allowed some forbidden fat (Horayot 1:1:3" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Horayot.1.1.3">Note 14) to be eaten., since the court does not bring a bull, an individual brings a female sheep or goat.

רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן פָּתַר מַתְנִיתָא בְּהוֹרָייַת בֵּית דִּין. הוֹרוּ בֵית דִּין לַעֲקוֹר אֶת כָּל־הַגּוּף. הוֹאִיל וּבֵית דִּין מְבִיאִין פָּר אֵין הַיָּחִיד מֵבִיא כִשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה. הוֹרוּ לְבַטֵּל מִקְצָת וּלְקַייֵם מִקְצָת. הוֹאִיל וְאֵין בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין פָּר הַיָּחִיד מֵבִיא כִשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה. Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah by instruction from the Court. If the Court ruled to eliminate the entire body, since the Court has to bring a bull a private person does not have to bring a female sheep or goat. If they ruled to confirm part and to eliminate part, since the Court does not bring a bull a private person has to bring a female sheep or goat⁵⁴Even though the text is confirmed by B, it cannot be accepted since Horayot 1:3:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Horayot.1.3.1">Mishnah 3 explicitly states the opposite (Horayot 1:1:6" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Horayot.1.1.6">Note 32), and R. Johanan does not disagree with an anonymous Mishnah. Therefore, one has to switch the place of the statements “bring” and “do not bring”. He disagrees with Samuel in that he does not require that a majority of the people act upon the instructions of the Court. If a single person consciously commits a sin by acting upon their instruction, the individual is barred from bringing a sheep and the Court is required to bring a bull..

שְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר מַתְנִיתָא. אַדַּיִין אֲנִי אוֹמֵר. מִיעוּט הַקָּהָל שֶׁעָשׂוּ חַייָבִין שֶׂאֵין בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין עֲלֵיהֶן פָּר. תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר עַם הָאָרֶץ. אֲפִילוּ כוּלּוֹ. אֲפִילוּ רוּבּוֹ. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן פָּתַר מַתְנִיתָא. אַדַּיִין אֲנִי אוֹמֵר. מִיעוּט הַקָּהָל שֶׁעָשׂוּ בְלֹא הוֹרָייָה חַייָבִין. שֶׁכֵּן בְּהוֹרָייָה אֵין בֵּית דִּין מְבִיאִין פָּר. שְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר. אֲבָל הֵן מְבִיאִין כִּשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה. רִבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר. לֹא הֵן מְבִיאִין כִּשְׂבָּה וּשְׂעִירָה. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל דּוּ יְלִיף לָהּ חַייָב מֵחַייָב נִיחָא. עַל דַּעְתֵּיהּ דְּרִבִּי יוֹחָנָן דּוּ יְלִיף לָהּ חִיּוּב מִפְּטוֹר. מַתְנִיתָא אָֽמְרָה פְלִיגָא עַל שְׁמוּאֵל. א֚וֹ הוֹדַ֣ע אֵלָ֔יו חַטָּאת֖וֹ אֲשֶׁ֣ר חָטָ֑א וְהֵבִ֨יא. יָצָא הַמְשׁוּמָּר. מַתְנִיתָא פְלִיגָא עַל שְׁמוּאֵל. נֶ֗פֶשׁ כִּי־תֶֽחֱטָ֤א. אַחַ֛ת תֶּֽחֱטָ֥א. בַּעֲשׂוֹתָהּ. הֲרֵי אֵילּוּ מִיעוּטִין. הַתּוֹלֶה בְעַצְמוֹ חַייָב. הַתּוֹלֶה בְבֵית דִּין פָּטוּר׃ הָדָא פְלִיגָא עַל שְׁמוּאֵל וְלֵית לָהּ קִיּוּם. Samuel spoke about the Mishnah: “I still am saying, if a minority acted they are liable because the Court will not bring a bull for them. The verse says⁵⁵Leviticus.4.27">Lev. 4:27., [from] the people of the Land. Even [all of them] (part of them)⁵⁶The text is a baraita in Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah 7(5), quoted in the Horayot.2b">Babli, 2b. Usually, a prefix מ “from” is interpreted to mean “not all”. This is behind the reading of B. The reading of the ms., in brackets, is that of Sifra and the Babli; it means that without instruction from the Court, any number of the people, maybe all except the members of the Court, may be required to bring private purification offerings simultaneously. This would not be a case that all of the congregation of Israel err(Leviticus.4.13">Lev. 4:13); this expression is reserved for pronouncements of the Court., even most of them.” Rebbi Joḥanan explains the Mishnah: I still am saying, if a minority acted without ruling they are liable because with instruction the Court will not bring a bull⁵⁷A person acting on the instructions of the Court can never bring a purification offering since his action is not inadvertent. If the conditions for such an offering by the Court are not satisfied, no sacrifice at all is due or possible for the action.. Samuel said, but they bring a female sheep or goat. Rebbi Joḥanan said, they do not bring a female sheep or goat⁵⁸This is a repetition of their prior positions. For Samuel, a private offering is due if and only if there is no Court offering. For R. Joḥanan, no offering is possible for action on the instruction of the Court, independent of what the Court has or does not have to do.. According to Samuel, who infers liability from liability, it is understandable. According to Rebbi Joḥanan, who infers liability from exemption⁵⁹Samuel is understandable; either the rules of the Court sacrifice or those of the private one do apply; never both together nor none of them. But might R. Johanan, who accepts a situation where both the individual and the Court are exempted from bringing an offering, have a situation where both apply simultaneously? The question is not answered.? The statement of a baraita⁶⁰Sifra Sifra Wayyiqra 2, Parašah7(7), quoted in the Horayot.2a">Babli, 2a. The apostate wants to forget; even if he really forgot it was desired by him; he never qualifies for a purification offering, even if his transgression happens to be in a situation for which the Court would have to bring an offering if its conditions were fulfilled. disagrees with Samuel. Or his transgression in which he sinned was made known to him¹⁸Leviticus.4.28">Lev. 4:28. Since he was informed that he failed to commit the sin, he cannot bring a purification sacrifice. His repentance for his sinful intent will be a private matter between him and God.; this excludes the apostate. A baraita disagrees with Samuel, “A person who would transgress; one would transgress; acting he would transgress; these are restrictions⁸The quotes are correct in the Yerushalmi text of the Babli editio princeps, but the first of the quotes in the Leiden ms. is a misquote, referring to Leviticus.4.2">Lev.4:2 instead of 4:27. The basic text is in Sifra Wayyiqra Parašah 7(1), referred to in Horayot.2b">Babli 2b, discussed in detail Šabbat93a.
Chapter 4 in Lev. treats the purification sacrifices for unintentional sin first by the High Priest (vv. 1–12), then the High Court (13–21), then a chief, identified in Horayot 3:2:1" href="/Jerusalem_Talmud_Horayot.3.2.1">Mishnah 3:3 as a king (22–26), and finally by a commoner (27–35). V. 27 reads: If one person of the populace transgresses inadvertently, by acting on one prohibitions of the Eternal, and feels guilt. It is noted that the sentence seems to be unnecessarily wordy. Why does it not say simply, “if somebody inadvertently transgresses a prohibition of the Eternal”? The additional words must have a meaning; they describe restrictions. In Shabbat.93a">Babli Šabbat93a one derives from the insistence that one person commit the sin that a violation of a commandment cannot be prosecuted if committed by two persons acting in common, so that no single person commits a punishable act but the combined result is a clear violation,. Such a violation cannot be atoned for by a purification sacrifice. It also is clear that only acts are punishable.
In the context here the additional terms are interpreted to mean that only a person acting on his own is required to offer a purification sacrifice; this excludes one who is told by a religious authority that his act is permitted.: the person depending on himself is liable, but one dependent on the Court is not liable.” This disagrees with Samuel and cannot be confirmed⁶¹If the Court permitted certain intrinsically forbidden things and an individual acted on his own but did what they had allowed, then both the Court and the individual have to bring sacrifices for the same kind of action..